

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

30 NOV 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : DCID 1/3, Priority National Intelligence Objectives

REFERENCE : Memorandum from DAD/NE to Chairman, USIB, DCID 1/3, PNIOs, dated 24 November 1959

1. This memorandum recommends action on Item 5 of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) Agenda for 1 December 1959. Such action is noted in paragraph 6 below.

2. The statement of PNIOs which has been presented to the USIB for consideration contains the following first priority item relative to Soviet space activities:

"1.f. Soviet capabilities, intentions and plans relating to the utilization and control of space."

The Air Force has been the most active in support of this wording.

3. A footnote to this item, agreed to by Colonel McFarland and myself, gives the following wording, preferred by us:

"1.f. Soviet activities in and relating to space which contribute significantly to, or are indicative of,

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Soviet military capabilities, or which significantly enhance Soviet prestige and psychological capabilities."

4. The purpose of this memorandum is to explain why Colonel McFarland and I believe that some more explicit statement of U.S. interests in Soviet space activities than the USIB representatives approved is required. As you know, our Committees are two of the technical committees of the USIB most directly concerned with space intelligence. We have experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining what we consider to be a reasonable level of activity on many facets of the Soviet space program. In some quarters there is great enthusiasm at launching time which then subsides rather rapidly or, at the other extreme, quantities of telemetry data which will never be analyzed are collected and stored. Moreover, some organizations profess interest only if military implications (which may be non-existent in the Soviet space program) can be found. The result is great unevenness in coverage. As we see it, the root of the problem lies in the absence of any restriction with respect to application of top priority effort to this intelligence problem or of any focus of attention on critical aspects. Operating agencies and the

analysis organizations are presumably obliged to attack all facets of the Soviet space programs with equal intensity. The result is a good deal of confusion and jamming up of these facilities with requirements far beyond their ability to meet. It is in order to get some division of emphasis, which will permit us to get the space intelligence which we feel is most urgently needed, that we recommend a more explicit statement in the PNIOs of U. S. intelligence interests.

5. It is our belief that there should also be a second priority PNIO on this same subject in order to complete the delineation of relative emphasis. Our Committees have agreed on the following wording for a new second priority PNIO:

"Soviet capabilities, intentions and plans relating to the exploitation of space for scientific and technological purposes."

6. The lack of agreement on space intelligence is reflected in the draft PNIOs before the USIB. It is strongly recommended that you support the SIC-GMAIC version presented in paragraphs 3 and 5 above at the USIB meeting on 1 December 1959.



Chairman

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